How do consumers form beliefs about future energy prices? Do they form these beliefs in a "reasonable" way? The answer to this question is key to an ongoing debate regarding the "energy paradox" -which stipulates that consumers systematically undervalue energy efficiency -as well as having important implications for all models of consumer demand for energy-consuming durable goods. We study these questions directly by analyzing two decades of survey data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, which asks a nationally representative sample of consumers about their expectations of future gasoline prices. Overall, we find that consumer beliefs follow a random walk, which we deem a reasonable forecast of gasoline prices, but we find a deviation from the random walk during the recent economic crisis of [2008][2009]. * The authors would like to thank Richard Curtin for guidance in using the data. For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank Lutz Kilian and seminar participants at
Introduction
When consumers choose among energy-intensive durable goods, they have to forecast the future price of energy in order to determine their willingness to pay for energy efficiency.
In turn, researchers modeling the demand for such durables must specify these consumer beliefs. How do consumers form these beliefs? Are their beliefs "reasonable"? How should researchers model consumer forecasts?
This paper directly answers these questions by analyzing two decades worth of high quality survey data on consumers stated beliefs about gasoline prices from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. The survey asks a nationally representative sample of households every month what they believe will happen to the price of gasoline in the future. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to utilize this unique cache of information, and there is no comparable data available from other sources.
How consumers forecast future energy prices relates to an ongoing debate about the optimal policy response to externalities from the consumption of energy. If consumers fully value energy efficiency, then the optimal solution to energy-related externalities is a direct Pigouvian tax on emissions or fuels. If consumers over or undervalue fuel efficiency, however, then alternative policies like efficiency standards or durable taxation may be appropriate.
The proper valuation of energy efficiency requires consumers to calculate the present discounted value of the future flow of energy savings from improved efficiency. This calculation involves various components, including discounting, future energy prices and usage. The literature on consumer valuation has generally built econometric models that jointly tests hypotheses about discounting, future energy prices and usage (Hausman 1979; Dubin and McFadden 1984; Allcott and Wozny 2009; Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer 2009; Sallee, West and Fan 2009) . No prior work has attempted to isolate the role of price expectations.
Moreover, no existing work measures consumer beliefs about future fuel prices, which is relevant well beyond the question of consumer valuation of efficiency. Any researcher modeling consumer choice among durable goods must specify consumers beliefs over future prices. A common assumption is that prices follow a random walk -this implies that today's prices are the best available estimate of future prices. Is this a good approximation of consumer beliefs?
Our analysis of the Michigan Survey of Consumer data on gasoline price forecasts indicates that the average consumer forecast looks very similar to a random walk. In our preferred specifications, consumer forecasts cannot be statistically distinguished from a random walk. In the paper, we employ a variety of robustness checks. The main caveat to the random walk result is that forecasts deviated significantly from a random walk during the 2008 financial crisis.
While a random walk is obviously not a perfectly accurate forecast, it historically has approximately equal predictive accuracy to futures prices (Alquist and Kilian 2010) . Thus, our results indicate that consumer beliefs are "reasonable", making it unlikely that consumer beliefs about future gasoline prices are the source of fuel efficiency undervaluation or that these beliefs should be the target of policy. Moreover, these findings provide justification for the common practice of assuming random walk beliefs in models of consumer demand for durables.
Estimating the demand for automobile fuel economy
To highlight the importance of knowing what consumers actually believe about the future price of gasoline, consider the following model of consumer demand for automobiles:
where: u ijt is the utility that consumer i derives from purchasing vehicle j at time t; p jt is the purchase price of this vehicle; E t [·] and its contents are expected fuel costs over the lifetime of the vehicle, in present value terms; X j is a vector of observable vehicle characteristics, such as interior volume or horsepower; ξ j is unobservable (to the econometrician) vehicle quality; and ε ijt is the idiosyncratic utility that an individual consumer derives from the vehicle.
In any given future time period t + s, fuel costs equal the number of miles m ij,t+s the vehicle is driven in that time period, multiplied by the vehicle's rate of fuel consumption in gallons per mile GP M j , multiplied by the price of gasoline in that future time period g t+s . Discounting at rate r and summing over the full, T -period lifetime of the vehicle gives total lifetime fuel costs in brackets. The last step is to take expectations (at period t) over this entire bracketed term, since a vehicle's lifetime, future miles, and the future real price of gasoline (which embodies expectations about future gasoline prices and inflation) are not known with certainty at the time of purchase -nor technically are the vehicle's future rate of fuel consumption per mile (which varies with driving conditions and can degrade over time)
or the real rate of discounting from one future period to the next. Thus, when trading off the purchase price of a vehicle (and other vehicle attributes) against expected lifetime fuel costs, a consumer must consider the fuel efficiency of the vehicle, the number of miles she plans to drive, and the future price of gasoline in real terms.
In this model, testing whether consumers "fully value" the benefits of fuel economy is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis that α = γ. Knittel and Sandler (2010) . Lastly, discount rates for vehicle purchase decisions can be inferred from interest rates, including rates on new and used car loans (after adjusting for expected inflation), which are available at the microlevel in some vehicle transaction data sets and in the aggregate from the Federal Reserve. In short, GP M j , T , m ij,t+s , and r -and close approximations of their expected values -are all readily observable to researchers, if not for individual vehicles and consumers, then at least for broad classes of vehicles and consumers.
Unfortunately, however, expected future gasoline prices, which are critical for calculating expected future fuel costs, are not directly observable to researchers. Thus, unable to observe these expectations directly, researchers in this literature almost always assume that consumers believe gasoline prices will follow a "random walk" (Busse et al. 2009; Sallee et al. 2009 ). That is, researchers assume that the expected future real price of gasoline equals the current price, simply replacing future gasoline prices g t+s in the expression above with the current price g t . Less frequently, researchers sometimes estimate their own econometric forecast models to predict future gasoline prices as a function of current and lagged macroeconomic variables. More recently, Allcott and Wozny (2009) assume that expected future gasoline prices equal the futures price of crude oil in commodity futures markets, plus an add-on to account for refining and distribution costs and taxes.
While fuel consumption per mile, vehicle lifetimes, future miles traveled, and discount rates are all directly observable or are sufficiently stable over time that they can be inferred accurately from historical data, this is not true of future gasoline prices. Future crude oil and gasoline prices are notoriously difficult to predict, and there is substantial controversy among academic and industry experts about what the future price of oil will be and how best to predict future oil prices (Hamilton 2009; Kilian 2009; Alquist and Kilian 2010) . Thus, in lieu of direct evidence, there is perhaps little reason to believe that consumer expectations will conveniently align with the random-walk hypothesis favored by applied researchers in this literature. One goal of our paper is to test this assumption directly.
Whatever the method for constructing consumer expectations for the future price, they all suffer from the same criticism: they replace consumer expectations for the future price of gasoline, which are unobservable, with the researcher's own assumption about what consumers believe. Take for example the case of the random walk assumption. Even if most academic and industry experts believe that that gasoline prices approximately follow a random walk, and even if alternative econometric forecast models do not perform much better, this does not imply that consumers actually believe prices will follow a random walk. Thus, assuming that consumers expect a random walk could lead to biased estimates of automobile demand if consumer expectations do not comport with this assumption. For example, if when gasoline prices increase by $1, consumer expectations of the future price increase by more than $1, then the random walk assumption will lead to an estimate of γ that is biased upward, away from zero: consumers will appear more sensitive to gasoline prices than they really are. If, on the other hand, consumer expectations for the future price of gasoline increase by less than $1 when the current price increases by $1, then conventional estimates of γ will be biased downward, toward zero: consumers will appear less sensitive to gasoline prices than they really are.
Data source
Our main data source is the Michigan Survey of Consumers (MSC), which surveys a nationally representative random sample of consumers each month, asking how consumers view prospects for their own financial situation, prospects for the economy in general over the near term, and prospects for the economy in general over the long term. Questions include, for example, "How about people out of work during the coming 12 months -do you think that there will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less?" and "Speaking now of the automobile market -do you the next 12 months or so will be a good time or a bad time to buy a vehicle?" A subset of these questions are aggregated into a single measure known as the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, which is widely followed as a leading indicator of economic performance. Each month's survey is based on responses from approximately 500 households. The survey has a short panel component: about one-third of respondents each month are repeat respondents from 6 months prior, another third are new respondents that will be surveyed again in 6 months, and the final third are new respondents that will never be surveyed again.
A core set of questions appears in every survey, dating to the beginning of the survey in 1982.
Individual researchers and other parties sometimes add questions for one or several rounds of the survey, however, and the survey has added and discontinued and even restarted various questions over time, so not all information is available in every time period.
We are primarily interested in a single question related to expected future gasoline prices, which appears in nearly every survey dating back to 1993 (with several short gaps) and then sporadically back to 1982: "Do you think that the price of gasoline will go up during the next five years, will gasoline prices go down, or will they stay about the same as they are now?"
The end goal of the questioning is to elicit information about the expected price change over the next five years. If respondents answer "stay about the same," then their expected price change is recorded as zero. If respondents answer "go up" or "go down," then they are asked a follow-up question: "About how many cents per gallon do you think gasoline prices will (increase/decrease) during the next five years compared to now?" Their expected price changes are then recorded accordingly. If consumers report a range of price changes, they are asked to pick a single number. If they refuse or are unable to pick a single number, then the median of their reported range is recorded instead. If consumers respond that they "don't know" or refuse to respond at any stage of the questioning, then their non-response is noted as such. Less than 1% of respondents are coded as non-response. Although we focus on expectations about gasoline prices in five years, which is the most relevant for automobile purchases, the survey has asked an identical set of questions about expected gasoline prices during the next twelve months since 2006 and occasionally during 1982-1992. From the wording of initial question, which asks whether consumers expect prices to "go up...or down," it is somewhat unclear whether consumers are reporting expected price changes in real or nominal terms. From the follow-up question, however, which asks by "how many cents" prices will change, it seems clear that consumers are being asked to report nominal price changes. Moreover, because the questions about gasoline prices follow several questions about expected inflation and prices in general, we suspect that consumers are primed to report gasoline prices in nominal terms. Thus, we assume from here on that consumers respond in nominal terms.
In addition to these MSC data on consumer expectations, we also collected data on contemporaneous gasoline prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). These data record the monthly, U.S. sales-weighted average retail price of gasoline (including taxes) for all grades of gasoline (regular, midgrade, and premium) and all formulations (conventional, oxygenated, and reformulated).
2 Ideally, we would like to be able to match individual respondents in the MSC data to state-level gasoline prices based on the respondents' state of residence. State-level gasoline prices are especially important when constructing individual expectations for future gasoline prices in real terms, as we describe below. At this point, however, we do not yet have access to state of residence for the respondents in the MSC data. We hope to obtain these data soon.
Because we assume that consumers are reporting expected future gasoline prices in nominal terms, we need to deflate these prices by some measure of expected inflation to facilitate comparison to the current price of gasoline. Fortunately, the questions about gasoline prices follow an earlier and analogous set of questions asking consumers directly about their infla- Lastly, we collect data on the Consumer Price Index (for all goods, urban consumers) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We have complete data on each of these variables for our study period of January 1993 to January 2010 (except for several small gaps due to missing MSC data).
Data procedures
LetC 60 t be the expectation at time t for the change in gasoline prices over the next 60 months (5 years) and letP t be the current gasoline price, both in nominal terms (as denoted by the tildes above the price variables). The expected price change is reported directly in the MSC data, while the current price is given by the EIA retail price data. We use these data to construct the expectation at time t for the nominal gasoline price 60 months into the future:
which is simply the nominal price of gasoline plus the expected price change in nominal terms. Now, let r t be the expectation at time t for the average annual inflation rate over the next 60 months (technically, 5-10 years). We deflate the expected future nominal price by five years at this expected inflation rate and then deflate again by the realized CPI to construct the expectation at time t for the real price of gasoline 60 months into the future (in January 2010 dollars):
where CP I t,Jan2010 is the CPI inflation factor from time t to January 2010 (and the lack of tilde denotes real dollars). We also convert the current price of gasoline from nominal to real dollars: P t . Deflating the price forecast by five years of expected inflation puts the forecast in time t dollars for an apples-to-apples comparison to the actual price of gasoline at time t; deflating both by realized inflation puts everything in January 2010 dollars for an apples-to-apples comparison over time. Having constructed both the real price forecast and the real retail price of gasoline, we can then construct the expectation at time t for the real change in gasoline prices over the next 60 months:
which is simply the real price forecast minus the current real price.
Our main analysis consists of testing whether the average (mean or median) MSC respondent believes that gasoline prices follow a random walk. We construct the "average" belief about future gasoline prices in several alternative ways. Our preferred approach is to calculate each individual's nominal and real gasoline price forecast, according to the equations above, based on individual MSC responses for expected price changes and expected inflation. Then, in the final step, we take the mean or median of these individual real price forecasts. The advantage of this approach is that it accounts for any correlation between individual expectations about future nominal price changes and expected inflation rates. One disadvantage of this approach is that we do not observe individual state of residence, which requires us to construct individual price forecasts based on national average retail gasoline prices. Not observing individual gasoline prices could be a problem in equation 3 above, since the individual-level measurement error enters nonlinearly, interacting with individual inflation expectations.
In addition to our preferred approach, we also construct the "average" belief about future gasoline prices by calculating the mean (or median) expected price change in the MSC responses first, adding this change to the current retail price to get the mean (or median) expected future nominal price, and then deflating this nominal price forecast by the mean (or median) expected inflation rate in the MSC responses. This approach does not account for possible correlation between individual nominal price expectations and individual expected inflation. Lastly, we construct the "average" belief using the mean (or median) expected price change in the MSC responses but deflating by the median expected inflation rate amongst professional forecasters based on a survey by the Philadelphia Fed.
Thus, we construct the "average" real price forecast in six different ways: three ways of deflating nominal price forecasts by expected inflation (each MSC respondent individually using his or her own expected inflation, in aggregate using the average MSC expected inflation, or in aggregate using the Philadelphia Feds survey of professional forecasters) by two ways of calculating the "average" response (mean or median).
Graphical analysis
Figures 1 -3 show the price series we use in our analysis. Our presentation of these figures follows our step-by-step discussion above for how we construct our main price series. Since we have several alternative ways of constructing these price series, we focus on median MSC price expectations deflated by median MSC inflation expectations. These figures look similar if we use means instead of medians, deflate individual price expectations by individual inflation expectations and then calculate the median, or deflate the median MSC price expectations by the median inflation expectation from the Philadelphia Fed. Figure 1a presents the nominal retail price of gasoline during our study period, along with the median MSC response for the expected nominal price change over 5 years. These series 
Regression analysis
We now test formally the null hypothesis that the "average" MSC respondent believes gasoline prices follow a random walk. Our econometric results will mirror the graphical analysis above, which suggests that the average consumer does forecast a real random walk. The naïve approach to implementing a regression-based test would consist of regressing the expected future price on the current price:
and then testing the joint null hypothesis that β 0 = 0 and β 1 = 1. This test could be conducted either in levels, as written, or in logs.
The current price of gasoline is highly persistent, however, as is the expected future price, regardless of whether we focus on mean or median expectations or how we choose to account for expected inflation. F 60 t , when measured by the median of the individual real price forecasts, has a first-order autoregressive coefficient of 0.979 in levels and 0.984 in logs.
The current price of gasoline P t has a first-order autoregressive coefficient is 0.975 in levels and 0.979 in logs. Given these coefficients, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests fail to reject unit roots on the real price and forecast series with p-values greater than 0.5 in all cases.
3 Thus, we estimate the model in first differences, using either price levels or logged prices.
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In our baseline specifications, we estimate the relationship between the monthly change in current prices and the monthly change in expected future prices, using prices in levels:
and using logged prices:
where the lower-case letters indicate logged price variables. We estimate these models using several different versions of the "average" expected future price. That is, we estimate the model based on both mean and median expectations, as well as based on three ways of accounting for expected inflation, for a total of six different versions. It appears from these results that the "average" consumer does not believe that gasoline two price series in levels, however, supporting the use of a model in differences. Persistence in the difference between the MSC real forecast and the current price of gasoline is evident in figure 2a . that is less than one-for-one, even after we exclude 2008. These results differ from those of panel A because panel A uses a dependent variable that is a mean (or median) of the change in a ratio, whereas panel B uses a change in the ratio of means (or medians). Whenever the two random variables in the ratio (here, the forecasts of the nominal gas price and of inflation) are not perfectly correlated, the ratio of means will be smaller than the mean of the ratio. This result is therefore a mechanical byproduct of the fact that the mean of the individual real price forecasts is consistent with random walk beliefs.
In panel D, we do not adjust for inflation at all, but rather regress the aggregate MSC nominal price forecast on the nominal price of gasoline. A $1 increase in the current price of gasoline is estimated to be associated with a $1 increase in the expected nominal future price when the entire sample is used. Given expected inflation of about 2%-3% per year, this finding implies that real prices only increase by about $0.85-$0.90, consistent with the estimates from panel A that used real prices and forecasts. The estimates using logged nominal prices and forecasts are very similar to those in panel A. This finding is consistent with the fact that expected inflation is fairly constant over time and that multiplication by a constant has no effect on the coefficient estimate in a log-log model.
After excluding 2008, the linear model suggests that a $1 increase in the current price leads to a $1.18 dollar increase in the expected future price, consistent with 2%-3% expected annual inflation, or a random-walk belief in real terms. Even more tellingly, the model in logs suggests that a 1% increase in the current price leads to a 0.98%-1.04% increase in the expected future price, which is not statistically different from 1%. Assuming that expected future inflation does not change dramatically from one month to the next, these results are further evidence that the average consumer believes gasoline prices to follow a real random walk.
The results in table 1 estimate the immediate response of expectations to changes in the current price of gasoline. It is possible that consumer expectations respond with a delay.
Thus, we estimate autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models that allow expectations to respond to changes in the current price with a delay. That is, we estimate dynamic models of the form:
These models allow changes in expectations to depend on changes in the current price of gasoline as well as on lagged changes in the price of gasoline and lagged changes in expectations from previous months. Table 2 presents the results of these regressions. Depending on the particular price series we used, we found that it was necessary to include up to 7 periods of lagged prices and expectations to eliminate the serial correlation in the error term. Thus, all of the results in the table are based on ARDL model with 7 lags (i.e., q = 7 in the equation above).
The table presents the "long-run" responses of expectations to a "permanent" increase in the price of gasoline. We also examined the "impulse response functions" associated with a permanent increase in the current price of gasoline. We found, however, that the long-run responses occurred almost immediately: in most cases, the short-run effect was statistically indistinguishable from the long-run effect upon impact. This finding is consistent with the fact that the long-run coefficients in the table are all very similar to the coefficients in table 1, which measure the impacts on gasoline price forecasts that happen immediately in response to a change in the current price.
Conclusion
Do consumers exhibit a "reasonable" forecast of future energy prices? Our analysis suggests that they do. Using two decades of high quality survey data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we find that consumers, on average, report random walk beliefs regarding the future price of gasoline. This is a reasonable forecast in the sense that the predictive power of a random walk forecast is comparable to the predictive power of futures prices, and there is no obviously superior forecast. This finding suggests that if there is an "energy paradox,"
it likely does not stem from consumers having systematic bias in their beliefs about energy prices and that researchers are justified in using a random walk assumption when modeling consumer demand for durables.
